The evolution of the aggregate labor market is far from smooth. I investigate the success of a macro model in replicating the observed levels of volatility of unemployment and other key variables. I take variations in productivity growth and in exogenous product demand (government purchases plus net exports) as the primary exogenous sources of fluctuations. The macro model embodies new ideas about the labor market, all based on equilibrium-the models I consider do not rest on inefficiency in the use of labor caused by an inappropriate wage. I find that non-standard features of the labor market are essential for understanding the volatility of unemployment. These models include simple equilibrium wage stickiness, where the sticky wage is an equilibrium selection rule. A second model based on modern bargaining theory delivers a different kind of stickiness and has a unique equilibrium. A third model posits fluctuations in matching efficiency that may arise from variations over time in the information about prospective jobs among job-seekers. Reasonable calibrations of each of the three models match the observed volatility of unemployment.
Introduction
Observed movements of employment and unemployment are larger than standard generalequilibrium models can comprehend, given the relatively small exogenous shocks that hit the economy. I investigate this topic in a family of models with labor markets that contain amplification mechanisms that may contribute to the understanding of volatility.
The models incorporate some standard features of modern general-equilibrium macroeconomics. Households plan consumption according to a standard Euler equation. Investment faces adjustment cost. With respect to the labor market, I depart from the main tradition of real business cycle and dynamic general equilibrium macro models. That tradition has considered the margin between employment in the market and time spent at home and has neglected time spent looking for work. I follow the other important tradition of modern macroeconomics, the matching model of job search. This line of thought considers the margin between working and looking for work and takes labor-force participation to be inelastic. In place of the Nash-bargain wage determination usually considered in that tradition, I consider two alternatives. First is the equilibrium sticky-wage formulation in Hall (2005c) . The wage is less responsive to current conditions, though not so sticky as to create bilaterally inefficient outcomes between employer and worker. Second is the bargaining model of Hall and Milgrom (2006) , which replaces non-credible threats to abandon wage bargaining with credible threats to extend bargaining. That model achieves a sticky-wage result by limiting the role of conditions in the labor market in wage determination. I also consider a model where fluctuations in matching efficiency drive unemployment fluctuations. The last model mimics fluctuations arising from changes in the quality of information available to job-seekers that induce alterations in self-selection, following Hall (2005a) .
The economy in this paper is explicitly non-stationary. I present essentially exact numerical solutions to a stochastic growth model whose levels of output, consumption, and capital have unit roots, inherited from the unit root in the efficiency of production. Rather than deal with filtered data to remove the unit root, I state the key variables as ratios to the capital stock. The model is stationary in these ratios.
I measure volatility in terms of changes in the variables. This approach captures the cyclical component of volatility along with the important movements that are not necessarily associated with any concept of a business cycle. The model and associated measurement approach do not rest on any attempt to separate cyclical movements from other movements. This paper is a further development of the efforts of Merz (1995) , Andolfatto (1996) , and Alexopoulos (2004) to incorporate unemployment in general-equilibrium macro modeling. The most important difference from earlier work is in wage determination and the amplification of fluctuations that occurs with equilibrium sticky wages and other nonstandard features of the labor market.
I find that departing from the standard view of the labor market is essential for understanding the volatility of unemployment. As Shimer (2005) has demonstrated, the standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) setup cannot rationalize movements of unemployment of the observed magnitude as the result of productivity shocks of the observed magnitude.
Non-standard labor-market models provide the needed amplification mechanisms. A basic idea common to all of the models-discussed in Hall (2005c) -is that employers determine the level of recruiting effort based on the expected share of the joint value created when they form matches with workers. In times when the share is low, recruiting effort is correspondingly low. Job-finding rates for the unemployed are low and the unemployment rate is high. Matches are formed and retained efficiently, according to the principle of maximizing joint value. Bilateral efficiency implies that the model's view of the labor market is one of economic equilibrium, not the disequilibrium previously associated with amplification mechanisms based on sticky wages.
The model overcomes one of the most persuasive criticisms of real business-cycle models-that the models portray recessions as the result of actual contractions in productivity (see Summers (1986) ). Here, in a growing economy, a recession with abnormal unemployment will occur when productivity growth is positive but lower than normal. I also show that movements in exogenous product demand are important sources of fluctuations.
This driving force has received less attention from earlier models.
At reasonable values of the key parameters-intertemporal elasticity of substitution, capital adjustment cost, and wage stickiness-the models account reasonably well for the volatilities of consumption growth, the investment/capital ratio, the capacity/capital ratio, and unemployment.
Model

Shocks
Serially independent shocks a t affect productivity A t , which evolves as
The shocks are drawn from a discrete set, {a 1 , ..., a 5 } with probabilities {ψ 1 , ..., ψ 5 }. Serially correlated shocks g t affect exogenous product demand. They are stated as ratios to consumption, c t , so the shocks to product demand are g t c t . They are drawn from a discrete set {g 1 , g 2 , g 3 } and obey a first-order Markoff process:
Technology, capital, and consumption
Let y t be output produced at time t, A t be the efficiency of production, n t be employment, k t be capital, x t = k t+1 /k t be the capital growth ratio (also the investment/capital ratio), v t be resources expended in recruiting workers, and c t be consumption. τ is a parameter controlling adjustment cost. Labor and capital form gross output according to
Adjustment costs are:
The government purchases part of output and another part leaves the country as net exports.
I take the sum of the two to be an exogenous fraction, g t , of consumption. Because the model is nonstationary, the exogenous component of product demand needs to be linked to a variable that grows according to the economy's stochastic trend; consumption is the most suitable choice because it is the most stable.
Capital deteriorates at rate δ, so it follows the law of motion
I let q t be the market price of installed capital at t. Firms solve the atemporal capitalinstallation problem:
The first-order condition is:
Tobin's investment equation. The Tobin coefficient, τ , controls capital adjustment. If τ = 0, capital does not adjust at all; the economy is the endowment economy of Lucas (1978) .
If τ = 1, capital adjusts without impediment and q is always one.
Households can buy and sell a claim to a unit of installed capital with price q t . Its return ratio is
Households have an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of σ. Their intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is
The marginal rate of substitution prices all economic values in period t + 1. I define the present value operator,
Households plan consumption to satisfy the Euler equation,
This setup makes the implicit assumption that individuals are fully insured for the idiosyncratic risk of unemployment-all individuals consume the same amount, independent of their employment situations. See Merz (1995) for further discussion of this point. Hall (2006) shows that consumption in the insured case reasonably approximates consumption in the case that workers are not insured against labor-market risks, with reasonable preferences.
Labor market
The labor market operates according to principles laid out in Hall (2005c) , Hall (2005b) , and, in a later section, Hall and Milgrom (2006) , based on some of the features of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) .
I normalize the labor force at one. The fraction of workers who lose their jobs each quarter is a constant, s. Among the job-losers, a fraction f t find new jobs immediately. The remainder find jobs after a quarter. Thus the unemployment rate is
and the separation rate is
This setup mimics actual unemployment reasonably well. The standard assumption, where unemployment lasts at least one period, cannot describe quarterly data, where it would imply an unemployment rate of at least 10 percent, the quarterly separation rate. The emphasis on the probability that a job-loser becomes unemployed is realistic-much of the variation in U.S. unemployment arises from fluctuations in the fraction of job-losers who become unemployed-see Hall (2005d) .
Job-seekers receive unemployment benefits at a flow rate λ t , financed by a lump-sum tax.
Workers receive compensation with present value W t from jobs starting in quarter t.
The Bellman value, U t , associated with being unemployed is the sum of expected unemployment benefits, the wage, W t+1 , paid by the job to be found next quarter, and the value, V t+1 , of being employed at that time, apart from the wages on that job:
The worker may (1) separate next quarter and find another job immediately, (2) separate next quarter and enter unemployment, or (3) remain at work. V t is the present value, while employed, of these three possible states next quarter:
I let Z t be the present value of the marginal product of the worker on a particular job, at the time the job begins. It satisfies the recursion,
Employers hire from two pools-workers just separated from jobs and workers who have finished a quarter of unemployment. In the first pool, employers devote an amount of output, v t , to recruiting and qualifying workers-v t includes all expenditures on workers that occur before the terms of a match are set through a wage bargain. Employers' recruiting spending determines the job-finding rate, f t . When employers are looking actively for new workers, jobs are easy to find and f t is high. The marginal benefit of added recruitment spending in terms of the job-finding rate declines with v t according to a concave function φ(v t /k t ). I scale by capital because recruiting and qualifying workers is more expensive in a more advanced economy.
My treatment of the matching process departs from the standard in the matching literature for reasons of modeling convenience, not substance. Linking the job-finding rate directly to recruiting expenditure can be seen as a reduced form of the usual set-up, where vacancies appear explicitly-see Hall (2005b) .
Employers earn a flow of profit in the first pool equal to the benefit from hiring one new worker (the employer's share of the surplus for a job, Z t − W t ) multiplied by the flow of new hires, sf t . The cost of recruiting the flow of workers is v t . Employers compete for the services of job-seekers in the first pool up to the point of zero profit:
In the second pool, workers previously unemployed for a quarter match costlessly with employers. Each match generates a rent Z t − W t for an employer. Employers cannot expend resources to alter the flow of these beneficial matches. This assumption, along with some other non-standard features of the labor market, has the substantial modeling benefit that unemployment is not a state variable. None of the non-standard features has any substantive effect on the behavior of unemployment or other labor-market variables.
Once matched, employers and workers from both pools face identical wage bargaining problems and arrive at the same wage. I assume that unemployment compensation is a constant fraction of the marginal product of labor:
Stationary model
λ t = λγz t (1 − u t ) γ−1 k t The model becomes z t+1 = a t+1 x −γ t z t (18) x t = 1 − δ + z t (1 − u t ) γ − 1 − τ 2τ (x t − 1) 2 − v t − (1 + g t )c t (19) x t = τ 1 − τ (q t − 1) + 1 (20) R t+1 = (1 − δ)q t+1 + (1 − γ)z t+1 (1 − u t+1 ) γ q t (21) m t+1 = β x t c t+1 c t − 1 σ (22) P t (R t+1 ) = 1 (23) U t = λγz t (1 − u t ) γ−1 + P t (W t+1 + V t+1 )x t (24) V t = P t (s t+1 f t+1 (W t+1 + V t+1 ) + s t+1 (1 − f t+1 )U t+1 + (1 − s t+1 )V t+1 ) x t (25) Z t = γz t (1 − u t ) γ−1 + P t ((1 − s t+1 )Z t+1 ) x t (26) v t = (Z t − W t )sf t (27) f t = φ(v t )(28)u t = s(1 − f t )(29)s t+1 = s 1 − u t .(30)
Wages
I will consider the following model of wage determination:
The quantity 1 2
is the average of the reservation wage of the jobseeker, U t − V t , and the reservation wage of the employer, Z t . It is the wage set in a symmetric Nash bargain, as in the earlier literature. To the extent that κ > 0, the wage is sticky compared to the Nash-bargain wage, as in Hall (2005c) . It does not respond as much to the immediate ups and downs of productivity. If κ = 0, the Nash bargain sets the wage. This wage rises when a favorable productivity shock, a t , hits the economy. Output rises more than the capital stock-this is true without capital adjustment costs, but is even more true in their presence. The scarcity raises the marginal product of labor, which is proportional to the state variable z t -see equation (26). The actual wage W t responds immediately through the Nash bargain. As capital rises to restore the normal output/capital ratio, z t returns to its normal value and the wage is back to normal in relation to the capital stock.
I set the parameter W * to the level of the wage/capital ratio in the stationary nonstochastic Nash-bargain model-the normal wage in the flexible-wage model. In the fixedwage model (κ = 1), the wage/capital ratio, W t , is constant at the level W * . That is, the wage remains at its normal level in relation to the capital stock rather than rising when productivity growth is strong and falling when it is weak.
Intermediate values of κ describe an economy with partial wage stickiness.
Equation (31) may place the wage outside the bargaining set-that is, below the jobseeker's reservation wage U t − V t or above the employer's reservation wage, Z t . I modify the equation to keep the wage within the bargaining set. Thus the sticky wage lies within the equilibrium set described in Hall (2005c) . Sticky wages never cause inefficient separations-they cause unemployment volatility through their influence on employers' recruiting efforts.
Other issues
I assume that the productivity and exogenous spending shocks each take on one of a finite For further details, see Judd (1998) and the appendix to this paper.
Notice that the model embodies a transversality condition that the variables tend toward a stationary point. In other words, a solution corresponds to a terminal condition in the distant future, not a condition that has an appreciable effect on the economy today. The transversality condition takes the form of the requirement that the consumption rule c g (z, u) depends only on z, u, and g. If the economy faced a terminal condition in finite time, the consumption rule would depend on that condition as well.
3 Volatility Measures Table 1 shows data for the years 1949 through 2000 for the volatility measures that I consider. The first is productivity growth, taken as an exogenous driving force of fluctuations.
The standard deviation of quarterly growth in total factor productivity is 0.94 percent. The second is the ratio of exogenous spending to consumption, another driving force. Its standard deviation is 4.8 percent.
The remaining measures are for variables taken to be endogenous in the model. Consumption growth has a quarterly standard deviation of 0.88 percent. The standard deviation of the investment/capital ratio (the growth rate of the capital stock) is 0.22 percent. I take unemployment to be stationary, so I measure its volatility as the standard deviation of its level, 1.57 percent. 
Functional Forms and Parameter Values
In my discussion of the volatility implied by the model, I will start from a base case for the key parameters: I take the wage stickiness coefficient κ to be 0.43, implying a wage that responds only partially to the current state of the economy. I take the base value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ to be 0.4, somewhat above the value suggested in Hall (1988) , in deference to suggestions in the recent literature of downward bias in my estimates. The implied value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 2.5, a reasonable value in terms of the discussion in Lucas (1994) . Finally, I take the base value of the Tobin coefficient for capital adjustment τ to be 0.25-see Hall (2004) .
I consider the following alternative values of the key parameters: Flexible wages, with κ = 0, less intertemporal substitution, with σ = 0.2 (with higher coefficient of relative risk aversion, 5), and faster capital adjustment, with τ = 0.5.
The driving forces for fluctuations in the model are technology growth, a t , and exogenous spending relative to consumption, g t . In both cases, I convert time-series data to discrete values by placing them in bins. I define the bins so that an equal fraction of the observations fall in each bin. In the case of technology growth, I take the deviation from the mean to be half the annual growth rate, to match the standard deviation of the observed annual data. The average values for quarterly productivity growth in the five bins are -0.90, -0.11, 0.26, 0.79, and 1.56 percent.
For exogenous product demand (the ratio of government purchases and net exports to consumption), I work directly with quarterly data. Table 2 describes the distribution. The average value of g t in each bin are shown in the columns labeled "Value." The table shows the transition frequencies among the three categories.
I take the rate of deterioration of capital and the labor elasticity of the production function to have the standard values δ = 0.025, and γ = 0.7. I pick the utility discount so that the average return to capital is 5 percent per year: β = 0.9992.
Recall that the parameter λ is the ratio of the value of non-work, including unemploy- I take the recruiting technology to have the form
I pick the efficiency parameter of the recruiting technology, ω, by setting up a version of the model with constant, non-stochastic productivity growth at the average rate from the values in Table 2 . I prescribe that the unemployment rate be its post-1949 average of 5.5 percent. I take the exogenous separation rate s to have the value 10 percent per quarter per month (see Hall (2005d) for a discussion of the measurement of the separation rate). Then I solve the model comprising equations (19) through (31) plus an additional equation that
gives the condition for a stationary z,
The solution provides the value ω = 8.9.
Properties of the Model
The state variables, z t , the capacity/capital ratio, unemployment, u t and g t , exogenous
spending, capture the current departure of the economy from its steady state. A favorable productivity shock increases capacity immediately and raises z t correspondingly. Investment responds immediately and capital begins to rise, driving z t back to its normal level until the next shock occurs. Productivity shocks are permanent in the model. On the other hand, exogenous spending shocks, g t , are persistent but ultimately die out, as ratios to consumption. A strictly permanent spending shock would depress consumption permanently by the same amount and leave all other variables unaffected. In the case where the spending shock dies out over time, investment falls at the time of the shock. The cumulating decline in the capital stock causes z t to rise gradually in the period after the spending shock. Investment rises later to restore the steady-state value of z t as spending returns to normal.
Thus z t has an exponential response to productivity impulses and a hump-shaped response to spending impulses. Table 3 reports the calculated volatilities for a variety of combinations of the key parameters. The base case, in the first column of results, fits the observed volatilities fairly well. The model slightly overstates the volatilities of consumption growth and the investment ratio and matches the volatilities of the capacity/capital ratio and unemployment fairly closely. Of course, the match is the result of adjusting parameter values, so Table 3 is really the result of applying indirect inference informally. As I will show shortly, the exogenous spending shock is an important contributor to the model's ability to explain volatility-in the presence of only the technology shock, the model understates volatility.
The second column of results shows the main point of the paper. Replacing the stickywage specification with the standard Nash-bargain model of wage determination, I find vastly too little volatility of unemployment. This finding confirms, in a general-equilibrium setting, Shimer (2005) The column of Table 3 headed "Lower intertemporal substitution" considers an economy with an intertemporal elasticity, σ, of 0.2 in place of the base value of 0.4. This economy has higher consumption volatility because the consumption substitution effect is smaller and offsets the wealth effect less. The volatilities of the investment/capital and capacity/capital ratios are-unrealistically-much higher because consumption absorbs less of each shock.
The column of Table 3 headed "Lower adjustment cost" describes an economy with a higher response of investment to Tobin's q. The coefficient, τ , is 0.5 in this economy against 0.25 in the base economy. A lower adjustment cost has remarkably little effect on the volatilities implied by the model.
Endogenous variables as functions of state variables
An instructive way to display the model is in terms of functions such as u g (z) that show how the key variables depend on the two state variables. These functions, represented as polynomials in z, are the results of solving the model, as described in the Appendix. 
Impulse response functions
The impulse response function is a standard tool for understanding the properties of dynamic models. I define the impulse response function as the difference between the mean of a variable following an impulse and the stationary mean of the variable. I characterize the impulse as a shift in the distribution relative to the stationary distribution. For the exogenous spending impulse, the alternative distribution is the one obtained by applying The magnitude of the effect is far greater for the sticky-wage case. With flexible wages, the incentive for job-creation, Z − W , hardly improves when Z rises, because W rises almost as much. With sticky wages, W rises as well, but not as much, so the incentive increases, spending on recruiting rises, and the labor market tightens. In both cases, the dynamics of z control the return to normal. The immediate effect of the technology impulse is a jump in z-the impulse raises the numerator of z while leaving its denominator, the capital stock, unchanged. As capital accumulates following the shock, z returns to normal and all variables, including the unemployment rate, also return to normal. Figure 6 shows the responses of unemployment to an increase in exogenous spending.
Again, the response is much more dramatic for the sticky-wage model. In that model, the initial effect of the impulse is to increase unemployment, because the increase in spending lowers the present value of future productivity, Z, immediately because it raises the expected future discount rate. This effect would be even stronger if labor supply were somewhat elastic. I explore these discount-rate effects below. After three quarters, a stronger effect from rising z overcomes the initial effect and unemployment begins to fall below its normal level. Eventually, unemployment turns around and returns to its normal level. The process is prolonged because the spending shock is highly persistent.
The role of variations in the discount rate
One of the important contributions of general-equilibrium analysis of matching models of the labor market is to assess the role of variations in the discount rate. Recall that the present value of a worker's productivity over the duration of a job, measured as of the beginning of the job, is To measure the role of variations in the discount rate, I create a version of the model in which the discount applied to the three labor-market variables, Z, U , and V , is constant rather than endogenous. I fix the marginal rate of substitution m at its stationary value from the calibration. In this model, unemployment is substantially more volatile-the standard deviation of unemployment is 3.9 percent, compared to 1.6 percent in actuality and in the base case.
Endogenous discounting reduces the volatility of unemployment. When a positive productivity shock hits the economy, the return to capital rises immediately. Consumption growth rises to satisfy the consumption Euler equation. Both immediate and future discount rates are higher. The value of Z is correspondingly lower than it would be with a constant discount rate. The reward to recruiting, Z − W , is also lower than it would be with a constant rate. This factor offsets the direct stimulus from higher productivity in raising Z, which therefore rises less than it would with a constant discount rate.
In the case of a positive shock to exogenous spending, the reason for attenuation of the effect on unemployment through the endogenous discount rate is similar, but not quite the same. Because the spending shock has no effect on productivity and no initial effect on the capital stock, the effects of the discount rate arise entirely through expectations of a higher future discount rate. The spending shock results in a decline in investment, which drives up the return as the shortfall in capital cumulates. The effect that is immediate in the case of a productivity shock occurs over time for a spending shock. Table 4 compares the standard deviations of the key variables in the full model (corresponding to the first column of results in Table 3 ) and in structurally identical models that have only the technology shock and only the exogenous spending shock. I find the exact solutions to the modified models, so that these results apply to economies where participants know about the nature of the shocks. The left column of results repeats the standard deviations from Table 3 for the full model. The middle column shows the effects of the technology shock alone by setting the exogenous spending shock to zero. The right-hand column shows the effect of the spending shock alone.
Contributions of the two driving forces
The spending shock is a little more important than the productivity shock for the investment/capital ratio, while the technology shock is a little more important for consumption growth and the capacity/capital ratio and rather more important for unemployment. Hall and Milgrom (2006) Table 4 . Contributions of technology and spending shocks job-seeker and an employer, having found each other, enjoy a valuable joint surplus that would be dissipated if one of the parties walked away from bargaining. Rather than walk away, a party can take a step to create a successful match. The sequential-offer bargaining model of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) provides a coherent framework for studying credible threats. At each step in bargaining, one party may accept an offer or make a counter-offer. The choice involves balancing the possibility of improving the terms of the bargain by making a counter-offer and the cost of the delay resulting from making the counter-offer rather than accepting the pending offer.
Credible Threats in Wage Bargaining
In the simplest stationary model of the wage bargain based on alternating offers and credible threats, the wage is
Here b/r is the net joint bias in the job-seeker's favor resulting from delay-the present value of the sum of the job-seeker's benefit from spending time bargaining rather than working and the employer's cost of extending the bargaining process. During bargaining delay, the job-seeker avoids burdensome work and continues to draw unemployment benefits. The employer incurs costs of time devoted to the wage negotiations. Notice that the capitalized value b/r replaces U in the earlier flexible-wage specification based on the Nash bargain with non-credible threat points. Although the wage is disconnected from current conditions in the labor market as measured by U , it remains sensitive to the value of the rest of the job-seeker's career, V . This value influences the wage bargain because one of the consequences of delay in making the bargain is to delay the receipt of V , which occurs at the moment the job-seeker makes the bargain and begins work.
The model with completely isolated bargaining has unrealistic implications for volatility. Hall and Milgrom (2006) present a version of the model in which bargaining is less isolated from conditions in the market because there is a hazard, s, that the productive opportunity will disappear during the bargaining process. The hazard is the same as the separation rate, the counterpart probability that the opportunity will disappear after employment starts. The unique equilibrium in the stationary bargaining game becomes:
Because s considerably exceeds r, this formula gives substantial weight to U and thus connects the wage to current conditions in the labor market, but not with the weight of one-half that U receives in the Nash bargain.
As Coles and Wright (1998) observed, the equilibrium of an alternating-offer bargaining game in a non-stationary setting depends on the dynamics of the environment. The dynamic equilibrium is the unique solution of the indifference conditions,
and
The bargaining bias, b t = ω t +γ t , is the sum of the worker's flow benefit and the employer's flow cost. W is the wage that a worker will propose and the employer accept, when it is the worker's turn, and W is the employer's counterpart. With a finite frequency of offers, the two will be different. I assume that the parties flip a coin to determine who makes the first (and only) offer. I further assume that individuals are insured against the risk of the coin toss, as they are against the risk of unemployment, so that all workers consume the same amount. Under this assumption, the wage is the average,
The wage obeys the following recursion:
I embed this equation in the earlier model, replacing equation (31) with equation (40).
In the stochastic growth model of this paper, the bargaining bias might reasonably be constant in relation to the capital stock or constant in relation to the marginal product of labor. I split the difference by making it a Cobb-Douglas combination of the two, with equal elasticities of 0.5. I pick the value of b so that, in the non-stochastic steady state, the wage is the same in this model as in the base case. See Hall and Milgrom (2006) for more details on these points. Table 5 In the credible-bargaining framework, fluctuations in unemployment arise more from changes in exogenous spending and less from fluctuations in productivity. Traditional Keynesian macroeconomics had the same perspective. Although the credible-bargaining model has the traditional property, the mechanism is rather different. When high exogenous product demand drives up short-term rates temporarily, job-seekers are at a disadvantage compared to normal times because extending bargaining is more costly. The wage bargain 
Fluctuations in Matching Efficiency
In the standard model, an exogenous decline in matching efficiency, modeled as a lower value of the parameter ω in equation (32), triggers a response in the labor market that resembles a recession. Absent an explanation for such a decline in matching efficiency, however, this account of a recession has little interest. Hall (2005a) describes a model that generates fluctuations of this kind, based on changes in the extent of self-selection among job applicants. When self-selection is high, matching efficiency is also high because employers enjoy a high yield from evaluating applicants.
In the model, a job-seeker has private information about her probability of qualifying for a particular job opening. A job-seeker sets a cutoff probability p * and incurs an application cost k W to apply for a job where the perceived probability of acceptance meets the cutoff. The employer incurs an evaluation cost k E and evaluates all applicants as long as the expected payoff from a hire covers that cost. The parties split the surplus equally-the model embodies the standard Nash bargain based on non-credible threats to disclaim the potential relationship.
The expected probability that an applicant is qualified-given that applicants use their private information and do not apply unless they know the probability to be at least p * -is a function χ(p * ). Job-seekers set p * according to
where S = Z − U + V is the surplus. Employers adjust their job postings to satisfy the zero-profit condition,
The ratio of the two defines a simple condition determining the cutoff:
Changes in the distribution of the information available to job-seekers and changes in the costs k W and k E cause shifts in the cutoff probability p * . The ratio of the costs is unlikely to be an important driving force. But movements in p * resulting from changes in information may be a potent driving force. When job-seekers become better informed, p * rises dramatically.
Fluctuations arising from self-selection operate as follows: An event occurs, such as a reallocation of labor from a shrinking sector to growing sectors. In consequence, the typical job-seeker is less well informed about about the likelihood of qualifying for a given job opening. Job-seekers lower their cutoff probabilities. Employers perceive a lowering in the fraction of applicants who are qualified and reduce their recruiting efforts correspondingly. Table 6 . Volatilities with variation in matching efficiency Job-seekers respond by further decreasing their application cutoffs. The positive feedback is less than complete and the labor market reaches a new equilibrium because the surplus rises as the market slackens-job-seekers' opportunity costs U − V are lower with higher unemployment and the surplus is thus higher.
The stochastic GE framework of this paper cannot embed the full self-selection model.
Instead, I treat changes in the cutoff probability as generating changes in the matchingefficiency parameter ω. I double the number of discrete states indexed by g to include two independent levels of ω. In the low-information state, I subtract a constant from ω and in the high-information state, I add the same constant. In the results reported below, the constant is 1.7. Thus ω moves back and forth from 7.2 to 10.6 instead of holding at its constant value of 8.9, as in the other models in this paper. I choose the switching probability to match the observed persistence of unemployment. Table 6 
Concluding Remarks
The equilibrium sticky-wage model, when incorporated in a complete dynamic stochastic macro model, gives a reasonable account of the volatility of key macro variables, including particularly the unemployment rate. A similar model with flexible wages set by a Nash bargain falls far short of matching the actual volatility of unemployment.
Not only does the model with equilibrium wage stickiness match the standard deviation of unemployment, but it is capable of explaining rare episodes when the unemployment rate exceeds 8 percent. As Figure 1 shows, such episodes occur about once every 40 years.
They are the result of an unlucky succession of productivity disappointments that result in a capacity/capital ratio that is well below its normal level. Wages fail to adjust fully, and the economy finds itself far to the left in Figure 4 , with little of the anticipated surplus from employment accruing to employers. They put correspondingly little effort into finding new workers, the job-finding rate is low, and unemployment is high. The situation gradually corrects itself, as the capacity/capital ratio moves back to normal.
An alternative model of wage determination based on credible threats and sequential offers yields wage stickiness and unemployment volatility similar to that found with the equilibrium sticky-wage specification. The alternative model supplies an answer to the primary objection to the equilibrium sticky-wage model, that it describes only an indeterminate equilibrium. The outcome of sequential bargaining is unique.
A third model capable of explaining observed unemployment volatility adopts the standard flexible-wage specification, but invokes shifts in matching efficiency. These shifts may be the result of changes in the amount of information job-seekers have about their likelihood of qualifying for jobs. Well-informed job-seekers self-select, thereby raising the yield from employers' recruiting efforts and raising matching efficiency.
The results in this paper suggest that modern ideas about friction in the labor market can 
The future value of a variable such as consumption is c g (z g,a ). To avoid cluttered notation, I will write z for z g,a when the meaning is clear. The present value operator is
The marginal rate of substitution is
The return is
The core functions in the model are x g (z), v g (z), U g (z), V g (z), and Z g (z). The conditions defining these functions are:
V g (z) = (50)
Z g (z) = γz(1 − u g (z)) 
